Barbarossa

	When Germany invaded Russia in 1941, they did so neither near-sighted or as a 
“back-handed” diplomatic ploy. While Russia remained a key objective to 
Hitler, it was also seen as a necessity for long-term victory and survival in 
Europe for Germany. “Plan Yellow”, as developed by Field Marshal Erich von 
Manstein, called upon the pre-emptive strike against an imperialistic Russia, 
using speed and superior leadership as keys to victory. To always remember the 
axiom: “History is written by the conquerers,” is key to the history of the 
German-Russian War 1941-1945.
	This paper intends to not only convey the necessity and the upside of a 
German attack and subsequent victorys but also the Russian Army’s offense 
stance of 1941. As Field Marshal Fedor von Bock wrote in his diaries “A sense 
of fright came over the OKH” (German High Command) “With no more enemies, who 
do we wait for to fight? Alas they had been waiting for us.”
	Germany in 1941 had reached a high point. The German economy, bolstered by 
it’s newly conquered lands, stood by itself with no equal. The citizenery had 
not  witnessed victory like 1939-1941 since the day of Fredrich the Great. 
Germany, bolstered by such a booming economy and national morale, had yet to 
truly begin it’s “witch-hunts,” nor had any of it’s concentration camps. While 
Jews were politically and often violently blamed and attacked for Germany’s 
ills, Hitler and the Nazi regime had at this point not begun the holocaust nor 
the mass killings. Most of Europe belonged to the Axis powers and Field 
Marshal Erwin Rommel’s Afika Korps, and the Italian Army had beaten the Allies 
to the far reaches of Africa. Mexico was being courted by the Axis diplomats 
and Brazil had remained nuetral, but swayed to Germany, (it’s imperialist 
conquerer). Japan had taken much of China and had moved towards Australia. 
Germany had no equal: economically, militarily, and no threat of one. 
	The reasons for an invasion of Russia are many, but very simply, in all 
respects it made perfect sense to retain and protect the security and future 
of Germany. Contrary to most opinions, Germany was not embroiled in a 
two-front war in 1941, mainly because of Britain’s inability to bring 
significant pressure to bear on Germany by land, sea, or air during the 
proposed time period of “Plan Yellow.” The naval blockade of German sea ports 
was failing miserably as the German empire was overly sufficient without 
imports. Britain’s traditional “trump card”: sea power and naval blockades of 
German ports would be rendered obsolete by a victory in European Russia.
	 If Germany defeated or eliminated Russia from the war, any British posture, 
even with the support of their empire would be meaningless in the face of 
German control of the fuel, iron, ore and agricultural resources of the entire 
continent. Britain would be at a complete loss and it would be her economy to 
collapse. Britain’s only option for obtaining critical materials, or victory 
of any sort, would appear to be in Africa. However, German air and ground 
forces freed from the continent (inner France, Germany, Austria, 
Czechoslavakia), could easily be diverted to Africa to prevent this. The 
destruction and conquest of European Russia would not only provide Germany 
with immense resources and capabilities to expand those resources, but it 
would also make Britain unable to carry on a fruitless war.
	Hitler’s Lebensraum, or literally “living space”, is misleading as Germany 
was not overcrowded and had conquered an immense buffer zone against her 
enemies and neighbors. Lebensraum sought resources- iron, ore, fuel, food, 
factory space- it did not have inside the boundaries imposed in the Versailles 
Treaty of 1917. Hitler, in each of his military endeavors sought out these 
necessary resources above military strategy, even above diplomatic means. 
Hitler had so handily conquered Poland, annexed both Austria and 
Czechoslavakia, defeated Belgium, and a large British Expeditionary Force, and 
France so quickly.The entire armed forces working brilliantly enough to 
overrun Norway, nuetralize Britain, and their U-Boats disrupting sea supply 
lines from America, Hitler turned to the showdown with Soviet Russia. In late 
1940 Hitler  suggested to a friendly Russia that she enter and join the 
German-Italian Pact of Steel. The negotiations over the spoils of war in the 
Balkans and Greece were bogged down, and a mutual distrust ended the 
negotiations. A war against Russia, while touted as a religious, ideological 
showdown, was really a spatial war that would either win the entire war and 
insure an all German Europe, or cost dearly and end in a withdrawl to the 1941 
border  so Hitler believed.
	In the week of July 22, 1940, chief of the general staff, Generaloberst Franz 
Halder, began to develop the strategy for an invasion of Russia. Under great 
pressure from Hitler, Halder turned to the pre-eminent strategist in Germany. 
A lower ranking general who was reknown in the military circles of the world, 
and would always remain a silent secret because of his anti-nazi beliefs: 
General Erich von Manstein. Manstein had developed, and drawn out to the 
smallest detail, the strategy for the invasion of France and the Low 
Countries, as well as the landings in Norway. 
	Manstein developed a similar plan to the invasion of France, instituting the 
German tactics of encirclement and pincher movements. However, unlike his 
strategy in France, cities and space weren’t the objective, destruction of the 
Red Army was. The plan depended heavily on the Russian reaction and the 
individual judgement and talent of the German field commanders. The field 
commanders of the time were experienced, finely-tuned, well educated and 
possessed as their greatest strength an extreme adaptability to enemies, 
strategy, terrain and goals. Manstein knew that the Russian reaction to the 
invasion remained paramount. If the Soviet High Command had a plan of 
immediate and systematic withdrawl into the east, the German invasion would 
only fail. The war would drag on in White Russia to the detriment of Germany. 
To Germany’s advantage and to Russian dispair, they stood, fought and died.
	The German High Command (OKH) did not enter the war blindly, if anything, 
they were very cautious and knowledgable. The pre-invasion planning was 
meticulous to the finest details, including the purchase of 15,000 light  
wagons and horses from a mountainous region of Poland, which were perfectly 
suited for the muddy and treacherous Russian terrain. Calculations of the 
Russian forces were at most overestimates of their tank and air capabilities, 
qualities and quantities. The invasion was well thought out. The most capable, 
competent and best-suited commanders were chosen, and the armies were 
well-trained, experienced and possessed high morale. As it has been stated, 
Germany knew the risks, yet had finally envisioned the key to total victory.
	The OKH’s goal during the invasion of France and the Low Countries was “To 
defeat the larghest possible elements of the French and Allied armies, and 
simultaneously occupy as much territory as possible in Holland, Belgium and 
Northern France.” Memories of the stand-off in World War I, relating to the 
battle plan, are simply a directive to capture as much land as possible before 
the Germans were stopped. It was a half-measure plan only to succeed in buying 
time and space, and to close the gap so that the Luftwaffe could operate 
defensively as well as offensively against England. No one had planned for or 
expected the conquest of France, or the speed of it (six weeks). The Balkan 
campaign which followed lasted only 18 days, and again with the armed forces 
of two states and a quality British Expeditionary Force routed, with light 
German casualties, (6,000). Germany had no reason to believe that the Russian 
campaign would last past it’s planned period (six to twelve weeks). 
	When Germany attacked, they had assembled three million personnel, of which 
almost two million were battle formations. The Russians had two and half 
million soldiers all in battle formations, within 100 miles of the border. The 
Germans prepared 120 divisions, 17 armoured, and called upon five Finnish 
divisions, 14 Rumanian, and two Hungarian: a total of 141 divisions. The 
Russian army, directly across the border, consisted of 144 divisions, of which 
35 were armoured divisions. The Red Army, in total, within 350 miles of the 
border to counter the Germans, had 245 infantry divisions, 74 aroured 
divisions, 13 motorized, and nine cavalry divisions: a grand total of 342 
divisions to counter Germany’s invasion force of 144 divisions.
	To examine the order of battle is to understand the depth of planning and 
Hitler’s belief in a victory. Hitler chose his best-suited generals, units and 
formations for the tasks laid out in the invasion strategy. The order of 
battle was broken into three groups: Army Group North, Center, and South. Army 
Group North, led by Field Marshall Ritter von Leeb, was by far the smallest 
force (29 divisions) and was aided by a Finnish Army attacking from Finland. 
The Russians had at the boundary, 24 divisions, four of which were tank 
divisions to counter the initial invasion. Their objective was to drive at a 
blitz pace to Leningrad (the spiritual capital of Russia), seize the city, 
destroy the Pacific fleet stationed there, and secure themselves east of the 
Balkans. Army Group South, led by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, consisted 
of 42 divisions. They were aided by 14 Romanian divisions and two Hungarian 
divisions, which were almost entirely infantry units used as support and 
security. Army Group South faced a superior  mass of Soviet forces and had to 
at the minimum, pin down and deny operational freedom of maneuver to those 
forces. Army Group South, and it’s 58 divisions, faced 62 divisions in the 
Ukraine, over 15 of which were armored divisions. Army Group Center was the 
centerpiece of the battle and key force. It was led by Germany’s best general 
(at the time) Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, and perhaps the greatest tank 
leader in history, Heinz Guderian. The Russians had clogged the border with 
battle formations, (58 divisions, of which 16 were armoured divisions) 
directly opposing Army Group Center. Their mission was to destroy the Russian 
army and advance towards Moscow.
	ARMY GROUP NORTH: 29 divisions; 3 Armoured, 2 Motorized
		Commander: Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb
		16th Army: Col. General Busch
		18th Army: Col. General von Kuechler
		Panzergruppe IV: Col. General Hoeppner(570 tanks)
	ARMY GROUP CENTER: 49 divisions; 9 Armoured, 6 Motorized
		Commander: Field Marshal Fedor von Bock
		4th Army: Field Marshal von Kluge
		9th Army: Col. General Strauss
		Panzergruppe II: Col. General Guderian (930 tanks)
		Panzergruppe III: Col. General Hoth (840 tanks)
	ARMY GROUP SOUTH: 42 divisions; 5 Armoured, 3 Motorized
		Commander: Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt
		11th Army: Col. General Schubert
		17th Army: Col. General Stupnagel
		6th Army: Field Marshal von Reichenau
		Panzergruppe I: Col. General von Kleist (750 tanks)

	The immense numbers and fighting quality of the Soviet armed forces in the 
Ukraine and Belorussia remains an interesting question in World War II. Many 
historians, especially Russian, have held and protected the stance that Russia 
was playing for time as early as August 1939. Using this defensive logic, they 
seek to explain the vast territories seized in Eastern Europe 1939-1941, as a 
supposed buffer zone against Nazi Germany. Hitler is portrayed as the 
aggressor in the invasion of Russia, yet the Soviet aggression and troop 
build-up leads to many unanswered and unsatisfactory questions. Were the 
Russians planning an attack on Germany? Were the Russians militarily and 
economically prepared for a war with Germany? 
	The Russians had seized 180,000 square miles: half of Poland, the Baltic 
republics, most of Finland, and Bessarabia, as a buffer against Germany. The 
Soviet manpower, resources, and weaponary dwarfed Germany and therefore, could 
do more than just protect itself. The Russian tanks had superior firepower, 
stronger armor, traveled faster and were easier to repair. (See Spreadsheet 
#1: Comparison of German-Russian Armor) Not only did the Germans have inferior 
artillery and tanks, but they were simply outnumbered, over 6/1. (See Graph 
#1: Tanks Available Operation Barbarossa)
	If the Germans were so vastly outnumbered and outgunned, why would they 
attack in 1941, if only for military and ideological reasons? The Russian 
defensive posture does not ring true, as their aggressive nature   of 
1939-1941 attests. The Russians were not “playing for time,” they consistently 
did business with Nazi Germany economically and politically. The Soviets were 
bargaining with the Nazis and Italians into forming an alliance, yet they 
sought more war booty than their adversaries were willing to give. 
	The massing of the Soviet Red Army directly on the border as a defensive 
measure is not supported by fact. After the invasion, the German forces found 
no real fortifications, trenches, tank traps or defenses of any sort on the 
Russian side. The best trained and experienced Soviet Army at the border had 
all of the latest equipment and weaponary. The heavy tanks (KV-1 and KV-2) all 
had fuel drop tanks for long distances.
	The only explanation for the troop concentration was a planned invasion of 
Romania in late 1941. However, that offensive was seven months away, it was 
too early for a mobilization. Also, the size of the invasion force was 
ludricrous, the entire Romanian army had less than forty divisions of 
substandard troops and equipment, with little armor. The gas tanks on the 
heavy tanks were not needed for the short invasion of Romania and the Soviet 
rail line was more than adequate for the resupply of the proposed invasion. 
The Russians had not supposedly“fallen prey” to the Nazis as had other 
countries; they knew full well that Germany would not stand stagnant. They not 
only took advantage of the opportunities and gifts Germany and Hitler gave to 
them, they asked for more. At the German-Italian Pact of Steel negotiations, 
Germany had stated their case and their ultimatum. Ribbentrop, the German 
diplomat stated on his last visit to Moscow before the invasion “Either stand 
with us or stand against us, the Fuehrer doesn’t mind.”
	The Germans who had gained so much in so little time did not see “standing 
pat” as a victory. Rightfully so, the Germans knew that in order to win the 
war they needed either Britain or Russia out of it. When Russia did not stand 
firm on the Pact of Steel, Germany no longer trusted it’s neighbor. 
Envisioning great wealth and opportunity in Russia, Hitler knew that without 
Russia, Britain was lost. However, if Britain was conquered, Russia would 
still exist and would pose a greater threat. If Hitler had not acted first, 
would the Soviets have launched an attack against him? The facts that are 
uncovered definately point to this possibility. However, history has shown 
that Germany did attack before these questions were to be answered.